PLS maintains an active litigation docket in state and federal courts, challenging severe and/or systemic violations of the rights of those incarcerated and their loved ones. Because of our limited resources, we focus our litigation efforts on systemic impact litigation to bring relief to the greatest number of people possible.
Below are the cases on our current docket.
Foster, et al. v. Mici, et al.
(Conditions of Confinement & Medical Care)
This case seeks to reduce the incarcerated population to a level that would allow for appropriate physical distancing in eating, sleeping, and recreation. Additionally, this lawsuit also pushes for the prohibition of confining anyone who has been civilly committed for alcohol and substance use treatment in correctional facilities.
On April 17, 2020, PLS filed a class action complaint, Foster v. Mici, and an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction seeking release for incarcerated people throughout the Commonwealth due to the COVID-19 pandemic. PLS’ emergency motion asked the court to order the defendants (Governor Charlie Baker, Commissioner Carol Mici, Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety Thomas Turco, and Parole Board Chairperson Gloriann Moroney) to use their authority to reduce the incarcerated population to a level that would allow for appropriate physical distancing in sleeping, eating, and recreation. In a separate claim, PLS also asked the court to prohibit the defendants from confining in a correctional facility any individual who has been civilly committed for alcohol and substance use treatment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 35. On April 20, 2020, the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court, but also referred the matter to the Superior Court for expeditious fact-finding. On April 27-April 29th, the Judge Robert Ullman conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued findings of fact on May 1st. The SJC then ordered plaintiffs to respond to motions to dismiss filed by the Parole Board and the Governor by May 4th and file briefs on the main case by May 6th with argument on May 7th. Unfortunately, on June 2nd, 2020, the SJC denied plaintiffs’ motion for an emergency preliminary injunction. Although the court recognized that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the situation inside the Commonwealth’s jails and prisons “is urgent and unprecedented, and that a reduction in the number of people who are held in custody is necessary,” it concluded that plaintiffs had not established, at least at this point in time, that DOC’s efforts to address the COVID-19 emergency are constitutionally inadequate.
Despite the denial of emergency relief, the case was far from over. The SJC expressed concerns that the lockdown conditions DOC has put in place to respond to the pandemic, including isolation, reduced access to medical and mental health care, deprivation of outdoor exercise, and the cancelling of activities and visitation may themselves become Eighth Amendment violations. Accordingly, the SJC transferred the case to the Superior Court with instructions that it “shall proceed as an emergency matter, with due speed in consideration of the circumstances.”
The SJC also ruled that a person cannot be civilly committed to a correctional facility under Section 35 for substance use treatment unless the judge makes a finding that: (1) “the danger posed by the individual’s substance use disorder outweighs the risk of transmission of COVID-19 in congregate settings”; and (2) “commitment is necessary notwithstanding the treatment limitations imposed by quarantine protocols.”
PLS filed a motion for class certification which was granted by the Superior Court on November 11, 2020. We then filed an emergency motion asking the court to order DOC to implement a home confinement program. The court denied this motion on December 18, 2020, in part because DOC reported that it was going to implement a home confinement program.
In light of major outbreaks of COVID 19 at MCI Norfolk, and several other facilities, PLS filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction on December 23, 2020, asking the court to order DOC to put into place other appropriate release mechanism to reduce the DOC population to a level where social distancing is possible. In January of 2021, we supplemented our motion with a claim that DOC was not in compliance with the decarceration law enacted by the Legislature as part of the budget. On February 17, 2021, the court denied this motion, ruling that the protective measures DOC had put in place meant it was not deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of people in custody. The court did not rule on our claims based on violations of the decarceration law, but allowed us to amend the complaint to assert that claim.
We appealed the denial of our renewed motion for a preliminary injunction to the single justice, who referred it to a panel of the Appeals Court. The SJC then granted our motion for direct appellate review. But on November 18, 2021, the SJC rejected our argument that the DOC’s failure to release people to allow for greater social distancing constituted deliberate indifference to prisoners’ constitutional right to health and safety. The Court held that Commissioner Mici’s efforts to control the virus without releasing people were adequate, particularly in light of vaccines.
On a somewhat more hopeful note, the Court chose not to rule on our separate claim that the DOC’s failure to consider releasing prisoners violates the provisions of the Decarceration law, which requires the DOC to use or consider using various release mechanisms to reduce the prison population, consistent with public safety.. These provisions have now been enacted twice by the Legislature, both times over the Governor’s veto. On February 3, 2022, PLS filed a motion for summary judgment on its claim that DOC is in violation of the Decarceration law. The defendants have also moved for summary judgment and argument was held on July 13th, 2022 before Judge Connolly.
Battle, et al. v. Sheriff, Bristol County
(Segregation & Mental Health Care)
This is a class action challenge to solitary confinement practices at the Bristol County House of Correction and Jail. We are co-counsel with the Mental Health Legal Advisor’s Committee. The complaint was filed in 2018, on behalf of all Bristol prisoners who have a mental illness. Plaintiffs challenged the failure to exclude prisoners with mental illness from segregation; the failure to take mental illness into account in the disciplinary process; and to provide adequate mental health care, particularly to prisoners in segregation. As a result, the suicide rate in Bristol County was alarmingly high, twice that of other Massachusetts county correctional facilities and three times the suicide rate for jails nationally. On June 29, 2023, the Superior Court approved the Settlement Agreement. Among other things, the Agreement calls for appointment of an independent settlement monitor. The monitor issued her first report on December 15, 2024, finding numerous instances of partial compliance and noncompliance, and noting BCSO’s failure to provide required documentation. A second monitoring visit, taking place from March 11-15, 2025, appeared to show progress in some aspects of mental health care but ongoing violations of settlement provisions governing restrictive housing. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are planning to pursue areas of noncompliance through the dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Agreement including, if necessary, resort to the Court.
Briggs, et al. v. Department of Correction, et al.
(Disability Discrimination & Medical Care)
This class action was filed in December 2015 against the Department of Corrections (DOC) on behalf of prisoners with hearing impairments, alleging discrimination in prison programming, healthcare, communications, emergency systems, disciplinary hearings, and work assignments. We co-counseled this case with Wilmer Hale and the Washington DC Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights.
In 2018, a settlement agreement was reached, resulting in deaf class members receiving access to ASL interpreters for medical appointments and others receiving hearing aids that had been previously denied. In 2019, an additional settlement required DOC to provide ASL interpreters, hearing aids, videophones, captioned telephones, vibrating watches/pagers, and other accommodations, with an independent monitor overseeing compliance. In November 2023, we filed a motion for non-compliance with captioned telephone and pager access, leading DOC to adopt new policies that now enable hundreds of prisoners to use captioned phones.
The sole unresolved issue from 2019 was emergency notifications. In January 2024, Judge Stearns ruled DOC violated federal disability laws by failing to provide emergency alarm access. DOC’s May 2024 remedial plan includes immediate pagers for all class members and visual alarm installation over three years.
Caron et al. v. Coppinger (Medical Care)
On April 23, 2025, PLS filed a federal class action lawsuit, challenging the Essex County Sheriff’s refusal to provide medically necessary treatment to people in his custody with Hepatitis C. Hepatitis C is a viral infection that can cause liver failure, cancer, and death, as well as a host of other serious medical conditions like kidney disease, diabetes, brain disorders, and heart problems. Although safe, effective, and widely available medications (direct-acting antiviral medications, or DAAs) for Hepatitis C have existed for more than a decade, Sheriff Kevin Coppinger denies this treatment to nearly everyone in Essex jails, forcing hundreds of people each year to endure unnecessary and potentially life-threatening physical consequences and suffering from a curable disease. The lawsuit claims that this constitutes deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of people in Essex jails, in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
This lawsuit comes seven years after PLS secured a landmark settlement requiring the Massachusetts Department of Correction to provide DAA treatment to people with Hepatitis C in state prisons. Based on evolving medical consensus and litigation in other states, Caron goes further than PLS’s DOC case by seeking DAA treatment regardless of disease stage and pushing for treatment for pretrial detainees. Named Plaintiffs Nathan Caron and Adam Cochrane sought Hep C treatment from Middleton House of Correction in Essex County for over a year prior to filing. The lawsuit seeks a court order requiring timely treatment for all people with Hepatitis C in Essex jails, routine testing upon admission, and connection to community care upon release. We filed our motion for class certification and supporting memorandum at the same time as the Complaint and are waiting for the Defendant’s response.
Cheek v. Massachusetts Parole Board
(Parole)
This suit was filed on November 30, 2021, on behalf of 10 individuals who have been successfully on parole for many years. Eric Tennen of Swomley and Tennen was initially the lead counsel in the case, with PLS as co-counsel. The Legislature understood that not everyone on parole needs to remain under parole supervision for the full length of their sentence. Thus, it enacted a statute authorizing the Parole Board to terminate parole if it is in the “public interest.” See G.L. c. 127 § 130A. Although this statute existed on paper, it was ignored in reality. The suit contends that the Parole Board has effectively repealed § 130A by adopting a blanket practice of denying termination in virtually all cases. Plaintiffs asked the court to order the Board to conduct timely and meaningful reviews of petitions to terminate parole.
In response to the suit, the Board agreed to draft regulations governing termination proceedings and conducted a public hearing in September of 2022 at which dozens of people on parole and their families gave compelling testimony. The board issued final regulations in December of 2022 that set up a process for people to apply for termination and criteria for the Board to consider in making termination decisions. Since the regulations have gone into effect, the Board has terminated parole for more than 20 individuals. In order to give people on parole more time to prepare parole-termination applications, and the Board more time to schedule and hold hearings on these applications, the court has stayed the case until May 30, 2025. The parties have now negotiated a settlement agreement that embodies the new regulations.
John Doe 1-3 v Massachusetts Parole Board
(Disability Discrimination in Parole)
In Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board, the Supreme Judicial Court, adopting the reasoning of an amicus brief filed by PLS, ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act requires the parole board to provide accommodations to incarcerated people with disabilities, including, where appropriate, a professional evaluation of how the disability may influence the person’s behavior, and assistance in locating community supports and services that might allow them to live successfully in the community. Since the board failed to apply the Crowell decision to other people seeking parole, PLS, along with the Mental Health Legal Advisors and the Disability Law Center, filed a class action complaint in June of 2023 on behalf of all prisoners with mental disabilities who have been discriminated against by the Parole Board. The suit alleges that their opportunity to be released on parole is significantly diminished by the Board’s ongoing failure to provide accommodations at all stages of the parole process.
The Board filed a motion to dismiss but has indicated to us that they are committed to putting into place procedures that will provide people with disabilities the accommodations they need. On April 17, 2024, the Court denied the Board’s Motion to Dismiss but transferred the case from Suffolk to Middlesex County. The parties subsequently agreed to a framework for negotiations and filed a joint motion to stay the litigation, which the Court allowed. Plaintiffs have provided the Board with proposed revised ADA policies and received comments back from the Board. The parties have had multiple productive settlement conferences.
Diggs v. Mici
(Brutality)
In January 2022, PLS and the law firm Hogan Lovells filed a class-action complaint against the Massachusetts Department of Correction, numerous correctional officers and supervisors, and the officials responsible for overseeing Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center during a campaign of systematic, extreme, and unconstitutional violence against more than a hundred prisoners that followed an assault on three correctional officers. The lawsuit highlights that brutality is not merely perpetuated by a few “bad apples.” Rather, it is perpetuated by a broken system that not only fails to rehabilitate incarcerated people but actively harms them physically and psychologically. The complaint alleges that high-level DOC officials authorized and encouraged the violence against prisoners. The lack of oversight and accountability in DOC prisons fosters a culture of violence, particularly towards Black and Brown people. The case is in federal district court in Worcester before Judge Guzman.
On October 3, 2024, the Court certified both a damages class and an injunctive class consisting of all prisoners at SBCC who were subject to a use of force during the events of January and February 2020. Plaintiffs estimate that about 160 people fit this definition. The Court also certified a subclass of all Black and Latinx prisoners who were subject to a use of force during the class period; in addition to the excessive force claim brought by all class members, the subclass has an equal protection claim alleging that Black and Latinx prisoners were targeted for particularly harsh treatment. The parties engaged in more than two years of extensive and hard-fought discovery. We obtained almost 100,000 pages of documents and hundreds of hours of video footage depicting uses of force and other events over the monthlong class period; we took 14 depositions; and we filed two motions to compel discovery.
In May 2025, after many months of negotiations, the parties reached an agreement to settle the case, which was preliminarily approved by the Court on May 30, 2025. It provides for substantial payments to class members; policy reforms aimed at reducing excessive force and racial discrimination by corrections officers; and attorneys’ fees for PLS.
Jane Doe, guardian of John Doe v. Luis Spencer, et al.
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This is an action seeking monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a client found incompetent to stand trial and committed to Bridgewater State Hospital. His legal guardian is the plaintiff. The client suffers from an advanced incurable degenerative brain disorder, which significantly impairs his physical, cognitive, and behavioral functioning. Since his arrival at BSH, he has spent more than 14,900 hours in seclusion in BSH’s Intensive Treatment (ITU) – his longest period of continuous seclusion in the ITU lasted a staggering 445 days – and he has been subjected to additional seclusion in the BSH Maximum Security Units on so-called Special Treatment Status. We claim that Defendants have subjected the client to prolonged isolation in non-emergency situations, sensory deprivation, and inhumane treatment and, at the same time, failed and continue to fail to provide him with appropriate medical treatment and therapies in keeping with the standard of care for this disease. These actions violate his rights under the Massachusetts Restraint law as well as his constitutionally protected right to be free from undue restraints and unsafe treatment, his right to be free from discrimination on the basis of his disability, and his right to adequate health care. On June 9, 2017, the Court allowed our motion to exclude defendant MPCH from the medical malpractice tribunal. On June 26, 2017, the court denied in part and allowed in part, the DOC defendants’ motion to dismiss, but our core claims survived. Mr. Doe was transferred from Bridgewater to Tewksbury State Hospital in May of 2017, where he is doing well. On May 14, 2018, a medical malpractice tribunal ruled in favor of the plaintiff. After mediation on September 25, 2018, we reached a significant settlement with all parties, including $290,000 to be paid by the DOC defendants. The agreement with the DOC defendants is contingent on approval by the court of the settlement agreement of the Minich II class action (described below) raising similar issues regarding seclusion and restraint. The court gave preliminary approval to that settlement at a hearing on February 11, 2020, and we have served a motion for final approval.
John Does 1-10 v. Commissioner of Correction, et al.
(Medical Care & Conditions of Confinement)
This class action represents men civilly committed under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 123, Section 35 for alcohol or substance use disorders who are placed in correctional facilities instead of treatment centers due to lack of community beds. The Court certified two sub-classes: men at MASAC (operated by DOC) and men at Stony Brook (operated by Hampden County Sheriff). About 2,000 men are incarcerated annually under Section 35. The Goodwin law firm serves as co-counsel with PLS.
The legal claims are:
Since filing, defendants made changes including transferring MASAC operations to clinical providers and removing correctional officers, though correctional authorities retain ultimate control. In December 2021, the court ruled Section 35 not facially unconstitutional because incarceration wouldn’t be needed if DPH created sufficient treatment beds.
Discovery closed in January 2025 after expert tours and depositions. Defendants filed motions claiming mootness due to DPH approval of facilities and seeking class decertification due to missing Hampden plaintiffs. Plaintiffs moved to substitute new representative plaintiffs.
On December 23, 2024, the Governor signed amendments requiring DPH to create sufficient non-correctional beds so MASAC can close by December 31, 2026. A settlement was reached with Hampden County limiting use of isolation and restraints. On March 25, 2025, the Court dismissed the case against DOC and other state defendants as moot due to the new law. The legal team plans to appeal.
Evelyn et al. v. Jenkins et al.
(solitary Confinement)
PLS, along with the Boston College Law School Civil Rights Clinic and the law firm Holland & Knight, filed a class action complaint on July 1, 2024 on behalf of all people incarcerated in a Behavior Assessment Unit (“BAU”) at any state prison or in the Secure Adjustment Unit (the “SAU-IV”) at Souza Baranowski Correctional Center. The SAU-IV and BAUs are the in the same prison units that DOC used to call “restrictive housing,” “special management,” and “segregation.”
The Complaint alleges that DOC chose to rename its Restrictive Housing Units in order to circumvent the text and intent of the Commonwealth’s Criminal Justice Reform Act of 2018 (“CJRA”), which, among other things, cabined the well-documented harms of restrictive housing by guaranteeing certain visitation, canteen, property, disciplinary, and procedural rights to those forced to live there. This lawsuit challenges the DOC’s refusal to grant people in the SAU-IV/BAUs the substantive and procedural protections afforded to prisoners in Restrictive Housing under the CJRA, the due process and equal protection clauses of our state and federal constitutions, GL c. 127 section 32 (the “kindness statute”), the DOC’s own DSU Regulations under 103 CMR 421, and the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act under G.L. c. 30A, et seq..
The Defendants have filed an Answer. After significant discussion, the parties reached agreement about the definition of the class and submitted an unopposed motion for class certification, which included over a dozen affidavits from men describing life in these units. On April 15, 2025, the court certified the class and both sides have served written discovery requests.
Linsenmeir v. Springfield Police Department
(Medical Care)
Along with the ACLU of Massachusetts and Goulston & Storrs, PLS represents the family of Madelyn Linsenmeir, who died while in custody of the Hampden County Sheriff’s Department on October 7, 2018. Her death received national attention after her family published a heart-rending obituary online describing Ms. Linsenmeir’s struggles with opioid addiction. PLS became involved when the Sheriff’s Department initially refused to allow Ms. Linsenmeir’s family to visit her as she lay dying in the hospital.
Ms. Linsenmeir was arrested in Springfield on September 29, 2018, then transferred to the Hampden County women’s facility in Chicopee, where she was denied medical care for nearly four days despite her complaints of chest pain and difficulty breathing and her clearly deteriorating medical condition; staff told her it was her own fault for using drugs. Only after staff discovered her unresponsive on the floor of her cell did they send her to the hospital, but it was too late. She died of a heart infection common to IV drug users a few days later.
We filed the Complaint alleging wrongful death and constitutional violations on March 5, 2020. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court denied. After several years of exhaustive fact and expert discovery, the family settled its claims against the City of Springfield and its police officers in April of 2024, for $900,000. Also in April, the federal court in Springfield denied the Sheriff’s Department’s motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the Department violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminatorily denying Ms. Linsenmeir medical treatment based on her opioid use disorder, a disability under the ADA. The court also denied summary judgment to a Sheriff’s Department nurse, ruling that a jury could reasonably find she violated Ms. Linsenmeir’s 8th Amendment right to adequate medical care.
After several postponements, trial was set for March 2025. On the Friday afternoon before the Monday the trial was to begin, Hampden County settled the claims against the county for a significant amount of money and agreed to numerous policy changes aimed at ensuring that all women entering the Women’s Correctional Center receive proper medical care. The changes include improving intake screening and assessment, documentation of medical complaints, training of medical staff on differential diagnosis, training on substance use withdrawal; establishing detailed minimum requirements for monitoring symptoms and vital signs of people undergoing withdrawal from different substances, and requiring daily wellness checks of all incarcerated people for the first 72 hours of their incarceration; requiring a warm handoff for any person on medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD) to a MOUD provider in the community upon release; and requiring access to all three types of MOUD for all people entering HCSD with OUD.
Lyons, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction & Stote, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction
(Conditions of Confinement)
These two cases were filed originally by pro-se prisoners to challenge new DOC visiting regulations that went into effect on March 23, 2018, and which require that all visitors be on a pre-approved visitation list. PLS filed amended complaints in July challenging several specific provisions of the regulations: (1) DOC has capped the number of visitors that each prisoner may receive, and has tiered the caps by security level, with prisoners in maximum security facilities only permitted 5 visitors, medium only 8 and minimum only 10; (2) DOC is only permitting prisoners’ to update their visitation lists twice per year; (3) visitors are only permitted to see one prisoner facility wide, and (4) the pre-authorization process is unduly burdensome, intimidating, and has made prisoners’ family members fearful for the security of their personal information. MA has now become one of the most restrictive states in the country with regard to visitation. The visitation caps punish prisoners who have maintained robust community connections vital to rehabilitation and re-entry and bar numerous visitors without any reasonable justification. Plaintiffs contend that the restrictions violate constitutional and Massachusetts law because they unreasonably limit visitation without any rational basis, and are arbitrary and capricious. All cases challenging these regulations were consolidated in Suffolk County.
On June 17, 2019, the court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. On May 22, 2024, after discovery was complete, the Court ordered the parties submit a status report, but did not send notice to PLS or any pro se litigants. The Court then dismissed the case in July of 2024 due to failure to provide a status update. PLS promptly filed a Motion to Vacate Dismissal given the lack of notice for the required status update. Although the Court acknowledged that it did not send proper notice for the required status update, it nonetheless dismissed the case. It reasoned that several Plaintiffs have either been released or are no longer interested in pursuing this action, and that there have been significant changes in the DOC’s visitation practices in the years since the case was filed, including post-COVID modifications and the availability of video visitation, that together present a different set of facts than existed in 2018. Notably, the Court specifically ruled that plaintiffs may bring a new action challenging current visitation practices.
PLS is preparing a new case focused on addressing additional visitation practices that are currently of greatest concern to people who are incarcerated and their visitors.
Minich v. Spencer, II
(Medical & Mental Health & Segregation)
This is an action for damages brought by the three named plaintiffs in a class action case that challenged the excessive and abusive use of seclusion and restraint at Bridgewater State Hospital, which used these techniques 100 times more frequently than any other psychiatric hospital in the country. On May 12, 2016, the court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in a groundbreaking decision stating that Bridgewater patients had stated a claim that their abysmal treatment and confinement under conditions more onerous than those in DMH hospitals violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Massachusetts Restraint Law, as well as their due process rights under the Federal Constitution. We are co-counseling with Eric MacLeish of Clark, Hunt, Ahern & Embry. After mediation, we agreed to a settlement of $1.5 million dollars for the class members, contingent on the approval of the court and the Legislature. The court approved the Settlement in January of 2021, and the Legislature appropriated the necessary funding in October. On January 9, 2022, we distributed the Settlement awards, ranging from $3,000 to $80,000 to class members who had filed claims. There are still several class members, however, who have not collected their payment, and we are trying to locate them.
Pearson v. Hodgson
(Conditions of Confinement)
This class action case, which was filed in May of 2018, is an outgrowth of the Petition we filed with the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Cable challenging exorbitant prison phone rates. PLS is co-counseling with the National Consumer Law Center, the Harvard’s Legal Services Center and Bailey Glaser, LLP. The complaint alleges that the kickback received by Bristol County Sheriff Hodgson from the prison phone company, Securus, is illegal under state law. The kickback effectively doubles the cost of phone calls for prison families and other consumers. If successful, this case will not only impact prisoners held at the Bristol county jail, but at all county facilities in Massachusetts that contract with Securus Technologies, and perhaps the DOC as well. In addition, it will significantly lower prison phones rates and return millions of dollars to the families and friends of prisoners who have paid these exorbitant phone rates over the last four years.
The case was removed to federal court by Securus Technologies and a hearing was held on October 23, 2018 on the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. On December 20, 2019, Judge Talwini denied both Sheriff Hodgson’s and Securus’ Motion to Dismiss, in any opinion strongly suggesting that the commissions are unlawful. Discovery is now underway. Defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and on July 26, 2019, we filed a motion for partial summary judgment and a motion for class certification. The court scheduled a hearing on these motions for March 23, 2020, but then cancelled the hearing because of COVID-19. The court rescheduled the hearing for June 11. At the hearing, she asked the parties to address the significance of G.L.c. 127, § 3, which both parties stated was not pertinent to the claim. However, on June 22, 2020, she held that the Sheriff does have the authority to charge telephone commissions, relying largely on the language in Section 3 relating to the sale of goods and services to prisoners that even the Defendant had rejected and that neither party had briefed. On July 20, we filed a motion to amend the judgment, and also asked her to certify the issue to the Supreme Judicial Court. On March 31, 2021, the Court allowed our motion and certified the question to the SJC. Unfortunately, on May 17, 2022, although it rejected the Section 3 argument, the SJC ruled that a special law transferring county government to the state implicitly authorized counties to collect and retain telephone fees. Although this is an extremely disappointing decision, we are optimistic that the Legislature will pass some version of the No-Cost Calls law that has been included in both the Senate and House FY23 budget.
Petition Seeking Relief from Unjust and Unreasonable Cost of Collect Telephone Calls from Prisoners
(Conditions of Confinement)
This is a petition filed with the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Cable on behalf of prisoners, family members, lawyers, and others who seek relief from the excessive costs and poor quality of telephone calls from prisoners in state and county facilities. In response to the Petition, DTC conducted a well-attended public hearing on July 19, 2012, at which it received powerful and compelling testimony about the high cost and terrible quality of prison and jail phone service, and on September 26, 2013, the DTC denied the phone companies’ motion to dismiss our petition and announced its intention to open an investigation. At the same time, the Federal Communications Commission was in the midst of its own regulatory process (dating back to 2000) in which PLS actively participated. In October of 2015, the FCC adopted permanent per-minute limits on in-state and intrastate rates as well as fees for services such as opening or closing a debit account. It also prohibited per-call surcharges. The Order cited and relied upon PLS comments in support of regulation. The providers challenged all of these provisions in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which stayed the per-minute limits pending appeal but left in place the prohibition of per-call surcharges, which took effect with regard to state prisons on March 17, 2016, and will take effect with regard to county facilities on June 20, 2016. The FCC also encouraged states to set lower rates. On August 4, 2016, the FCC granted a motion for reconsideration and ordered slightly higher rates: $0.13 per minute for debit card and pre-paid calls from state prisons, $0.19-$0.31 for debit calls from jails (with the smallest jails allowed the highest rate), and higher rates at the outset for collect calls, dropping to the debit rates by 2018. However, the court of appeals has stayed these limits.
The Massachusetts rate cap (as challenged by the Petitioners) was $0.10 per minute plus a per-call charge of up to $3.00. With the FCC’s ban on per-call charges, the telephone companies sought to maintain their profits – and their kickbacks to jails in the form of “commissions” – by folding the surcharge into the per-minute rate. They also asked that the Investigation in our case be closed. PLS asked that the full investigation into the rates and the quality of serviced proceed, and argued that in the interim the companies could profitably operate at $0.10 per minute. On June 14, 2016, the Hearing Officer ordered a full investigation into all issues raised by the Petitioners. However, it stayed the investigation pending a ruling on the FCC regulations and set interim rates at $0.21 per minute for debit and prepaid calls, and $0.25 per minute for collect calls.
One of the phone companies has now asserted that DTC has no jurisdiction to regulate prison phones and has unilaterally raised its rates above the cap. The DTC has yet to take a position on whether it has jurisdiction. Consequently, we, together with the National Consumer Law Center, have sued both Sheriff Hodgson and Securus Technologies – the telephone provider – for taking money from customers to pay kickbacks to the Sheriffs. See Pearson v. Hodgson, described below.
Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction
(Segregation)
A class action case filed on January 20, 2012, bringing due process claims on behalf of all prisoners who are or will be confined in long term non-disciplinary segregation in an SMU. As in LaChance v. Commissioner, it requests that all prisoners confined under conditions as restrictive as a DSU be given the procedures described in the DSU regulations. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds that the Department of Correction has agreed to apply LaChance to all prisoners. Since the court rejected our claim that the DOC is misapplying LaChance, we appealed. In August of 2015, the Appeals Court dismissed the case as moot over a strong dissent, Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 629, 630 (2015). The SJC then granted our request for further appellate review, and on October 21, 2016, ruled that the case was not moot, and clarified that DOC continues to be obligated to follow the DSU regulations in all restrictive segregation units. We are now back in the Superior Court and have filed a renewed motion for class certification and a motion to amend the complaint.
Paszko v. Commissioner of Correction
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This class action case was filed on June 10, 2015 in federal court and seeks to compel DOC to treat prisoners with Hepatitis C with the new medications that were approved by the FDA in 2014. PLS is co-counseling the case with National Lawyers Guild member firms Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin and David Kelston. The new medications are a dramatic improvement over their predecessors, curing nearly one hundred percent of patients, with few side effects. Yet DOC was treating only a handful of prisoners primarily because the medications are extremely expensive. The complaint alleged that the failure to provide this essential treatment violates the Eighth Amendment rights of the more than 1,500 prisoners in DOC custody who have Hepatitis C. The court certified the case as a class action. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on February 15, 2018 and the Court approved it on June 29, 2018. The Agreement calls for medications to be provided to hundreds of prisoners who were previously denied treatment. We are now monitoring compliance.
Roberio v. Chair, Massachusetts Parole Board
(Parole)
This is a challenge on ex post facto grounds to the retroactive application of an amendment to G. L. c. 127, § 133A, which allows the parole board to increase the maximum permissible period between parole hearings ( called the setback period)from three to five years for persons serving life sentences who are denied parole. On October 24, 2019, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded for further discovery to determine whether prisoners given a four or five-year setback had a realistic opportunity to obtain an earlier hearing, or whether the right to request such a hearing was illusory. PLS filed an amicus brief before the SJC and is now co-counseling with CPCS in the Superior Court, where discovery is now complete and we have served a motion for summary judgment.
PLS has filed several cases challenging the Commissioner’s denial of medical parole. They are described below.
Brenda Brousseau v. Commissioner of Correction
Ms. Brousseau is a 72-year-old medical parole client who lives in the MCI-Framingham Health Services Unit and whose declining medical condition renders her unable to perform many basic activities of daily living independently. After her petition for medical parole and request for reconsideration were denied by the Commissioner of Correction, PLS filed a complaint for judicial review in Suffolk Superior Court on June 17, 2024, alleging that the most recent denial was arbitrary and capricious because the Commissioner concluded that (1) Ms. Brousseau’s condition may improve despite a declaration from licensed physician that Ms. Brousseau was permanently incapacitated and without any hope of meaningful improvement, and (2) Ms. Brousseau’s release would pose a public safety risk despite DOC’s own standardize risk assessment, classification report, and age-related research, as well as Ms. Brousseau’s physical condition and minimal disciplinary history, suggesting otherwise. After expedited briefing, the court heard the parties cross-motions for judgment on the pleading on August 21, 2024. Unfortunately, on September 20th, the court ruled in favor of DOC.
Jose Hernandez v. Commissioner of Correction
This is a certiorari action in the Superior Court on behalf of Jose Hernandez, a 66-year-old Spanish-speaking man with advanced Alzheimer’s dementia challenging the Commissioner’s denial of Mr. Hernandez’s petition for medical parole, which PLS had filed on his behalf in August of 2024. In the denial, the Commissioner disregarded DOC’s own medical director’s finding that Mr. Hernandez has very severe cognitive decline (7 out of 7 on the Global Deterioration Scale), and essentially ignored other evidence of Mr. Hernandez’s profound cognitive incapacitation. Instead, the Commissioner focused on weak evidence that Mr. Hernandez might be physically capable of shooting a gun. The Commissioner additionally faulted Mr. Hernandez for symptoms of his disability—such as non-compliance with medication (even though Mr. Hernandez can’t give informed consent), and an incident where he hit his hand against the glass of his cell—as well as for his non-participation in prison programming, which was never actually available to Mr. Hernandez due to the language barrier.
In addition to requesting a ruling that the Commissioner’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it disregarded his cognitive incapacitation, we are seeking a declaratory judgment that the Commissioner violated the ADA by holding symptoms of Mr. Hernandez’s disabilities against him without evaluating whether he could be accommodated with appropriate supports and services on parole, and the Equal Protection Clause by using his inability to speak English as a proxy for race to exclude him from medical parole.
Casey v. Mici, et al.
Mr. Casey is a 78-year-old man with serious medical issues, including emphysema and a heart condition. He lives in the Clinical Stabilization Unit at MCI Norfolk, a specialized housing unit for prisoners who require medical care and assistance with activities of daily living. He is on continuous oxygen therapy. He is likely to die within 6 to 12 months. Even though the superintendent at MCI Norfolk recommended medical parole, the commissioner denied the petition. PLS filed the Complaint on July 17, 2020. We have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the hearing on January 11, 2021, the court asked for further briefing on the issue of whether DOC abused its discretion by conditioning parole on his not living with his wife.
Emma v. Mici, et al.
Mr. Emma is a 66-year-old man who is dying from aggressive liver cancer and suffers from unremitting pain. As of July was not expected to live more than 4-8 months. On July 31, 2020, PLS filed suit challenging the Commissioner’s decision to deny medical parole. On August 12th – the morning of the hearing – the Commissioner changed her decision and granted Mr. Emma parole based on his deteriorating condition. The Court agreed to retain jurisdiction to make sure DOC does what is necessary so that Mr. Emma can actually be released. Mr. Emma was released at the end of September!
Luce v. Mici, et al
Mr. Luce is a 74-year-old man with a host of serious medical problems that have left him physically incapacitated. According to DOC’s medical provider, he suffers from progressive weakness and pain, and is unable to walk without assistance, and needs help with basic tasks of daily living such as holding his food tray. Even though the superintendent at MCI Norfolk recommended medical parole, the commissioner denied the petition. PLS filed the Complaint on July 20, 2020. We have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and are awaiting a hearing.
St. Germain v. Mici
Mr. St. Germain is an 87-year-old man with multiple medical issues who lives in the Clinical Stabilization Unit at MCI Norfolk, a specialized housing unit for prisoners who require medical care and assistance with activities of daily living. According to his doctors, his “debility and incapacitation are permanent, and they have worsened in that he is able to walk only short distances, he sleeps longer hours during the day, and his cognitive impairment has progressed.” His doctor also opined that Plaintiff is “very likely to die in the next 18 months.” Nevertheless, the Commissioner denied his petition for medical parole on May 12, 2020, and PL S filed the Complaint on July 10, 2020. We have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and are awaiting a hearing.
Smith v. Mici
Mr. Smith was 87 years old and suffering from severe dementia when the Commissioner denied his petition for medical parole. On June 26, 2020, we submitted a request for reconsideration to the commissioner and also filed a complaint in the superior court challenging her decision. Before the case could be heard in court, the commissioner granted medical parole and transferred Mr. Smith from the correctional unit at the Shattuck Hospital. Unfortunately, he died two days later. The case is still pending because it raises questions about the effect of medical parole on a person who is also civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person.
Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board
(Conditions of Confinement)
We filed an amicus brief on behalf of PLS, the Center for Public Representation, and the National Disability Rights Network in a case before the Supreme Judicial Court. The Plaintiff is represented by the Harvard PLAP. The issue is whether and to what extent the parole board may consider a person’s disability as a factor in determining the person’s suitability for parole; and whether the board has an obligation to reasonably accommodate a parole applicant’s disability in setting the terms and conditions of parole. Argument was held on January 6, 2017.
Ahearn v. Vose
(Conditions of Confinement)
Challenge to the lack of adequate sanitation facilities at Southeastern Correctional Center. In 1994, after oral argument in the Appeals Court, PLS negotiated a settlement that required DOC to install toilets at SECC. After the toilets were installed, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff’s damages claim on qualified immunity grounds. On September 2, 2005, the Appeals Court reversed this decision ruling that plaintiffs confined at SECC between 1991 and 1993 could go forward with a trial on damages. However, we were not able to find any class members who were able to satisfy the various hurdles by the court to be eligible for damages. The case has been dismissed.
Archer v. Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board
(Classification & Parole)
A challenge to Parole Board’s parole revocation procedures for second-degree lifers. Although the Supreme Court and the Board’s own regulations provide that parolees serving life sentences should have a revocation hearing within 60 days of return to custody, under the Board’s practice, these hearings are routinely delayed for more than six months, and prisoners frequently wait for more than a year before receiving a decision. The problem is that the Board conducts two hearings, the first which focuses only on whether the parolee violated a condition of parole is held in time. But the Board then conducts a second hearing to determine whether the violation deserves revocation and this hearing is delayed for months. On June 26, 2015, the court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the first hearing was sufficient. We have appealed and briefs are filed, including an Amicus from Harvard and NE prison assistance projects. Oral argument was held on October 18, 2016.
Bentley v. Sheriff, Essex County
(Conditions of Confinement)
This is a class action challenging the Essex County policy of charging prisoners fees for medical care, including a $30 “medical processing fee” charged to all prisoners upon admission. We are co-counsel in the case with David Kelston and Jeffrey Thorn under the auspices of the National Lawyers’ Guild. After we filed suit, the Defendants’ agreed to stop charging the contested fees. The case has been certified as a class action. On February 10, 2014, the court approved a settlement agreement that requires the Sheriff to return all the fees previously taken. In March of 2016, the court authorized payment of attorneys’ fees, with PLS receiving $35,000 and approved distribution of $71,000 in residual funds to two organizations in Essex County that provide substance abuse treatment to released prisoners.
Burns v. UMass Correctional Health Program
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This case sought injunctive relief and damages for a prisoner who for years was denied surgery to repair a torn ankle ligament, despite recommendations by orthopedic specialists for surgical intervention. Defendants denied surgery for ever-changing reasons that included Burns’ mental illness and a belief that he did not need a stable ankle to function in his segregation unit. The medical malpractice tribunal approved the malpractice claim. The court denied the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The case was settled in February of 2015.
Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction
(Segregation)
A class action case filed on January 20, 2012, bringing due process claims on behalf of all prisoners who are or will be confined in long term non-disciplinary segregation in an SMU. As in LaChance v. Commissioner, it requests that all prisoners confined under conditions as restrictive as a DSU be given the procedures described in the DSU regulations. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds that the Department of Correction has agreed to apply LaChance to all prisoners. Since the court rejected our claim that the DOC is misapplying LaChance, we appealed. In August of 2015, the Appeals Court dismissed the case as moot over a strong dissent, Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 629, 630 (2015). The SJC then granted our request for further appellate review, and on October 21, 2016, ruled that the case was not moot, and clarified that DOC continues to be obligated to follow the DSU regulations in all restrictive segregation units. We are now back in the Superior Court and have filed a renewed motion for class certification and a motion to amend the complaint.
Converse v. Massachusetts Department of Correction, et al
(Brutality & Mental Health Care)
This is a case for damages and injunctive relief brought by a 52-year-old pre-trial detainee with severe mental illness and cognitive disabilities who suffered physical and emotional injury as a result of an assault by correctional officers at Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center. Mr. Converse was on a Mental Health Watch because of severe self-injurious behavior when correctional officers sprayed a chemical agent into his cell and physically attacked him, breaking his shoulder in several places. In addition to claims that the use of excessive force violated Mr. Converse’s constitutional rights, the complaint alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act because DOC policies allow the use of force on those who are not capable of complying with orders, fail to require mental health clinicians determine whether the use of force is contraindicated or whether alternative interventions might be effective, and do not allow for reasonable modification to DOC’s standard use of force procedures and techniques to take into account the unique vulnerabilities of incarcerated individuals with mental health and cognitive disabilities. Mr. Converse has been released and discovery is complete. The Defendants filed for summary judgment, but before argument could be held, the parties agreed to a settlement.
Couchon v. Sheriff, Essex County
(Staff Assaults)
This is a case brought by a prisoner who suffered severe wounds when he was attacked and bitten by a K-9 police dog while lying on the ground at the Essex County Correctional Facility. The complaint alleges that Essex County has a policy and practice of directing dogs to bite prisoners even where not necessary to subdue the prisoner or quiet a disturbance.
Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board
(Conditions of Confinement)
Court. The Plaintiff is represented by the Harvard PLAP. The issue is whether and to what extent the parole board may consider a person’s disability as a factor in determining the person’s suitability for parole; and whether the board has an obligation to reasonably accommodate a parole applicant’s disability in setting the terms and conditions of parole. Argument was held on January 6, 2017.
Dinkins and Ivy v. Massachusetts Parole Board
(Parole)
PLS filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Judicial Court in a case that challenges the Parole Board regulation prohibiting the parole board from aggregating life sentences with consecutive sentences to set a single, combined parole eligibility date. Before a person can be released from prison, the Board must first grant parole on the life sentence to the consecutive sentence. The person remains in prison serving the consecutive sentence even though he is on parole from the life sentence. When he reaches the parole eligibility date on the consecutive sentence, the Board conducts a second parole hearing at which it considers for the first time whether the person can be released to the community. PLS argued this practice is both irrational and inconsistent with the case law and statutory framework governing parole. The case was argued on September 10, 2020.
Disability Law Center v. Commissioner of Correction
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This case is a challenge to the practice of confining prisoners with mental illness in DOC segregation units, including the DDU. PLS is partnering with the Disability Law Center, the Center for Public Representation, Bingham McCutchen, and Nelson Mullins. We filed the Complaint in federal court on March 8, 2007. The parties signed a settlement agreement in November of 2011 that requires the DOC to maintain sufficient high security treatment units to house inmates with serious mental illness who would otherwise be in segregation. After several difficult hearings, Judge Wolf approved the settlement on April 14, 2012, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement during a three-year monitoring period. Our most recent monitoring site visits took take place on March 9 and 10th. Although there are still significant issues with the treatment of prisoners with mental illness placed in segregation, the DOC has, for the most part, been responsive to the concerns expressed by our expert. Although the agreement is scheduled to terminate in April of 2015, the Legislature has enacted a statute that embodies the key elements of the agreement. See G.L. c. 127, § 39, as amended in January 2015.
Disability Law Center v. Commissioner of Correction
(Segregation)
This case is a challenge to the practice of confining prisoners with mental illness in DOC segregation units, including the DDU. PLS is partnering with the Disability Law Center, the Center for Public Representation, Bingham McCutchen, and Nelson Mullins. We filed the Complaint in federal court on March 8, 2007. The parties signed a settlement agreement in November of 2011 that requires the DOC to maintain sufficient high-security treatment units to house inmates with serious mental illness who would otherwise be in segregation. After several difficult hearings, Judge Wolf approved the settlement on April 14, 2012, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement during a three-year monitoring period. Our most recent monitoring site visits took take place on March 9 and 10th. Although there are still significant issues with the treatment of prisoners with mental illness placed in segregation, the DOC has, for the most part, been responsive to the concerns expressed by our expert. Although the agreement is scheduled to terminate in April of 2015, the Legislature has enacted a statute that embodies the key elements of the agreement. See G.L. c. 127, § 39, as amended in January 2015.
Does v. Patrick
(Conditions of Confinement)
This class action case challenges the incarceration at MCI Framingham of women with alcohol or substance abuse disorders who have been civilly committed under G.L. c. 123, § 35, and who are neither charged or convicted of a crime. At Framingham, these civilly committed women are housed with and treated as ordinary prisoners, and receive no substance abuse treatment. We are co-counseling the case with Wilmer Hale, the ACLU, and the Center for Public Representation. The case has been assigned to Judge Woodlock who granted our motion for class certification. In response to our suit, the Baker administration has established new treatment units for women at Shattuck Hospital and Taunton State Hospital. On January 25, 2016, the Legislature enacted an amendment to Section 35 that was intended to prohibit Section 35 commitments to MCI Framingham. Defendants have stopped committing women to MCI-Framingham as of April 24, 2016, and filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot. Shockingly, however, Defendants have taken the position that the amended statute still allows commitments to MCI-Framingham if “approved” by the Department of Public Health. Therefore, on June 10, 2016, the court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss because a real controversy still exists about the meaning of Section 35.
Ferreira v. Spencer
(Classification & Parole)
This case challenges DOC’s disciplinary and classification response to prisoners found with cell phones. Currently, DOC’s practice is to charge the prisoner with a level 2 offense: Possession of Tools Likely to be Used in an Escape. Upon guilty finding, prisoners are then reclassified and scored under the Classification Manual as having an escape history. All of this occurs even where there is absolutely no evidence or suggestion that the phone was being used for an escape or escape plan. On October 1, 2013, the Court ruled in favor of the prisoner, declaring that the guilty finding must be vacated because there was no evidence that Ferreira was using the cell phone to plan an escape. Although we have learned that DOC has stopped treating several other prisoners as escape risks based on possession of a cell phone, we will monitor how DOC treats prisoners found with cell phones to determine if further litigation is necessary.
Foster, et al. v. Mici, et al.
(Conditions of Confinement & Medical Care)
This case seeks to reduce the incarcerated population to a level that would allow for appropriate physical distancing in eating, sleeping, and recreation. Additionally, this lawsuit also pushes for the prohibition of confining anyone who has been civilly committed for alcohol and substance use treatment in correctional facilities.
On April 17, 2020, PLS filed a class action complaint, Foster v. Mici, and an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction seeking release for incarcerated people throughout the Commonwealth due to the COVID-19 pandemic. PLS’ emergency motion asked the court to order the defendants (Governor Charlie Baker, Commissioner Carol Mici, Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety Thomas Turco, and Parole Board Chairperson Gloriann Moroney) to use their authority to reduce the incarcerated population to a level that would allow for appropriate physical distancing in sleeping, eating, and recreation. In a separate claim, PLS also asked the court to prohibit the defendants from confining in a correctional facility any individual who has been civilly committed for alcohol and substance use treatment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 35. On April 20, 2020, the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court, but also referred the matter to the Superior Court for expeditious fact-finding. On April 27-April 29th, the Judge Robert Ullman conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued findings of fact on May 1st. The SJC then ordered plaintiffs to respond to motions to dismiss filed by the Parole Board and the Governor by May 4th and file briefs on the main case by May 6th with argument on May 7th. Unfortunately, on June 2nd, 2020, the SJC denied plaintiffs’ motion for an emergency preliminary injunction. Although the court recognized that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the situation inside the Commonwealth’s jails and prisons “is urgent and unprecedented, and that a reduction in the number of people who are held in custody is necessary,” it concluded that plaintiffs had not established, at least at this point in time, that DOC’s efforts to address the COVID-19 emergency are constitutionally inadequate.
Despite the denial of emergency relief, the case was far from over. The SJC expressed concerns that the lockdown conditions DOC has put in place to respond to the pandemic, including isolation, reduced access to medical and mental health care, deprivation of outdoor exercise, and the cancelling of activities and visitation may themselves become Eighth Amendment violations. Accordingly, the SJC transferred the case to the Superior Court with instructions that it “shall proceed as an emergency matter, with due speed in consideration of the circumstances.”
The SJC also ruled that a person cannot be civilly committed to a correctional facility under Section 35 for substance use treatment unless the judge makes a finding that: (1) “the danger posed by the individual’s substance use disorder outweighs the risk of transmission of COVID-19 in congregate settings”; and (2) “commitment is necessary notwithstanding the treatment limitations imposed by quarantine protocols.”
PLS filed a motion for class certification which was granted by the Superior Court on November 11, 2020. We then filed an emergency motion asking the court to order DOC to implement a home confinement program. The court denied this motion on December 18, 2020, in part because DOC reported that it was going to implement a home confinement program.
In light of major outbreaks of COVID 19 at MCI Norfolk, and several other facilities, PLS filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction on December 23, 2020, asking the court to order DOC to put into place other appropriate release mechanism to reduce the DOC population to a level where social distancing is possible. In January of 2021, we supplemented our motion with a claim that DOC was not in compliance with the decarceration law enacted by the Legislature as part of the budget. On February 17, 2021, the court denied this motion, ruling that the protective measures DOC had put in place meant it was not deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of people in custody. The court did not rule on our claims based on violations of the decarceration law, but allowed us to amend the complaint to assert that claim.
We appealed the denial of our renewed motion for a preliminary injunction to the single justice, who referred it to a panel of the Appeals Court. The SJC then granted our motion for direct appellate review. But on November 18, 2021, the SJC rejected our argument that the DOC’s failure to release people to allow for greater social distancing constituted deliberate indifference to prisoners’ constitutional right to health and safety. The Court held that Commissioner Mici’s efforts to control the virus without releasing people were adequate, particularly in light of vaccines.
On a somewhat more hopeful note, the Court chose not to rule on our separate claim that the DOC’s failure to consider releasing prisoners violates the provisions of the Decarceration law, which requires the DOC to use or consider using various release mechanisms to reduce the prison population, consistent with public safety.. These provisions have now been enacted twice by the Legislature, both times over the Governor’s veto. On February 3, 2022, PLS filed a motion for summary judgment on its claim that DOC is in violation of the Decarceration law. The defendants have also moved for summary judgment and argument was held on July 13th, 2022 before Judge Connolly.
Ivey v. Spencer
(Segregation)
This case is brought by prisoners sentenced to long-term solitary confinement in the Departmental Disciplinary Unit (DDU). It challenges the DOC’s practice of denying credit towards a DDU sentence for any month in which a prisoner is convicted of serious disciplinary offenses, is convicted of two less serious disciplinary offenses, or fails to attend a monthly review session. The suit argues that this practice extends DDU sentences without due process, and violates regulations requiring a special DDU hearing before a DDU sentence is imposed. The court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on May 7, 2014. We appealed, and the Appeals Court reversed in August of 2015, declaring DOC’s practice was unlawful.
LaChance v. Commissioner
(Segregation)
This case is part of the long effort by PLS to ensure that prisoners in segregation receive due process, building on the foundation established by the SJC more than 20 years ago in Hoffer, and reaffirmed in Haverty. On April 6, 2010, the superior court allowed our motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that because conditions in the Special Management Unit (SMU) at Souza Baranowski Correctional Center were substantially equivalent to conditions in the Department Segregation Unit (“DSU”) described in Hoffer, its operations must be governed by the DSU regulations. On August 25, 2010, the court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration. Defendants appealed on qualified immunity grounds. On November 27, 2012, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court decision that the plaintiff’s due process rights had been violated but held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law had not previously been clearly established. Although the Court held that the DSU regulations were not constitutionally required, it ruled that prisoners are entitled, as a matter of due process, to a hearing within 90 days of placement in segregation. In 2014, the court awarded us $28, 578 in attorneys’ fees. The Defendants’ motion for reconsideration was denied but they appealed. The SJC sua sponte took direct appellate review, and, on October 21, 2016, affirmed the trial court’s award of fees and also ruled that LaChance is entitled to fees and costs for successfully defending the fee award.
Jane Doe, guardian of John Doe v. Luis Spencer, et al. (Medical & Mental Health Care)
This is an action seeking monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a client found incompetent to stand trial and committed to Bridgewater State Hospital. His legal guardian is the plaintiff. The client suffers from an advanced incurable degenerative brain disorder, which significantly impairs his physical, cognitive, and behavioral functioning. Since his arrival at BSH, he has spent more than 14,900 hours in seclusion in BSH’s Intensive Treatment (ITU) – his longest period of continuous seclusion in the ITU lasted a staggering 445 days – and he has been subjected to additional seclusion in the BSH Maximum Security Units on so-called Special Treatment Status. We claim that Defendants have subjected the client to prolonged isolation in non-emergency situations, sensory deprivation, and inhumane treatment and, at the same time, failed and continue to fail to provide him with appropriate medical treatment and therapies in keeping with the standard of care for this disease. These actions violate his rights under the Massachusetts Restraint law as well as his constitutionally protected right to be free from undue restraints and unsafe treatment, his right to be free from discrimination on the basis of his disability, and his right to adequate health care. On June 9, 2017, the Court allowed our motion to exclude defendant MPCH from the medical malpractice tribunal. On June 26, 2017, the court denied in part and allowed in part, the DOC defendants’ motion to dismiss, but our core claims survived. Mr. Doe was transferred from Bridgewater to Tewksbury State Hospital in May of 2017, where he is doing well. On May 14, 2018, a medical malpractice tribunal ruled in favor of the plaintiff. After mediation on September 25, 2018, we reached a significant settlement with all parties, including $290,000 to be paid by the DOC defendants. The agreement with the DOC defendants is contingent on approval by the court of the settlement agreement of the Minich II class action (described below) raising similar issues regarding seclusion and restraint. The court gave preliminary approval to that settlement at a hearing on February 11, 2020, and we have served a motion for final approval.
Kelley v Hodgson
(Conditions of Confinement)
This case deals with unlawful conditions and severe overcrowding at Ash Street Jail in New Bedford and the House of Correction in North Dartmouth (Bristol County). In 1998, the court issued a preliminary injunction designed to curb overcrowding. In September 2004, the court expanded the injunction to prohibit the Sheriff from housing prisoners in locked cells that do not have toilets. On September 24, 2008, the court denied, in major part, the Sheriff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Sheriff has appealed to the extent that the ruling rejected his claim to qualified immunity. On September 24, 2009, the court allowed Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, essentially converting the preliminary injunctions issued in 1998 and 2004 into permanent relief. The Court also held the Defendants are not protected from paying damages by qualified immunity. The Defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity. However, the parties were able to negotiate a settlement that memorializes all the relief granted by the court, and awards fees to counsel. The Court approved the settlement on December 18, 2012, and we are monitoring compliance.
Minich v Spencer
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This is a class action brought to challenge the excessive and abusive use of seclusion and restraint at Bridgewater State Hospital, which uses these techniques 100 times more frequently than any other psychiatric hospital in the country. We are co-counseling with Eric MacLeish of Clark, Hunt, Ahern & Embry, and the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee. After long and contentious negotiations, we entered into a settlement agreement calling for substantial changes to seclusion and restraint practices. The court gave final approval to the agreement on February 23, 2015. We also settled the claim for attorneys’ fees with approximately $31,000 received by PLS. We have been monitoring compliance and have asked the court to rule that the Defendants are not in substantial compliance with the Settlement Agreement based on their failure to prevent a patient from committing suicide while in seclusion and the continued excessive use of seclusion and restraint.
Minich v. Spencer, II
(Medical & Mental Health & Segregation)
This is an action for damages brought by the three named plaintiffs in a class action case that challenged the excessive and abusive use of seclusion and restraint at Bridgewater State Hospital, which used these techniques 100 times more frequently than any other psychiatric hospital in the country. On May 12, 2016, the court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in a groundbreaking decision stating that Bridgewater patients had stated a claim that their abysmal treatment and confinement under conditions more onerous than those in DMH hospitals violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Massachusetts Restraint Law, as well as their due process rights under the Federal Constitution. We are co-counseling with Eric MacLeish of Clark, Hunt, Ahern & Embry. After mediation, we agreed to a settlement of $1.5 million dollars for the class members, contingent on the approval of the court and the Legislature. The court approved the Settlement in January of 2021, and the Legislature appropriated the necessary funding in October. On January 9, 2022, we distributed the Settlement awards, ranging from $3,000 to $80,000 to class members who had filed claims. There are still several class members, however, who have not collected their payment, and we are trying to locate them.
Nascarella v. Cousins
(Staff Assaults)
This is a case brought by a prisoner at the Essex County House of Correction who was viciously and needlessly assaulted by officers who broke his back and nose and also caused serious facial lacerations and other injuries. Plaintiff was then subjected to substandard and inadequate medical care when nursing staff failed to properly examine him and treat his serious injuries. Defendants removed the case to federal court and discovery is ongoing. After the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied, the parties engaged in mediation and reached a settlement with all Defendants in July of 2015.
Nathanson v Commissioner of Correction
(Conditions of Confinement)
This case challenges the new Department of Correction policy of subjecting prison visitors, including attorneys, to a search by a drug-detecting dog as part of the initial screening search. If the dog alerts to the possibility of drugs, the visitor must agree to submit to a further search, including a pat search or strip search. PLS has challenged this policy on grounds that it violates existing Department regulations, and was promulgated without a public hearing as required by the Administrative Procedures Act. There are six plaintiffs, including attorneys and family members of prisoners. PLS is co-counseling with a private attorney, Leonard Singer, and the ACLU. On February 28, 2014, the court issued a preliminary injunction barring DOC from using dogs to search lawyers but denied our motion asking for a similar bar against searches of regular visitors. On November 1, 2016, the court issued a ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, basically affirming the preliminary injunction ruling appealed. We have appealed and filed our brief on April 14, 2017.
Nunes v. UMass Correctional Health
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This state court case seeks injunctive relief and damages for a prisoner seeking timely, proper dental treatment rather than delays that necessitated extractions, and who seeks adequate physical therapy and accommodations for his confirmed leg, back, and neck ailments. The Court granted the defendants’ motion on the leg, back, and neck issues, but allowed the case to go forward on the plaintiff’s dental claims. The case was settled in February 2015.
Pappargeris v. MHM Correctional Services, Inc.
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This is an action for wrongful death and civil rights violations brought by the family of a very mentally ill prisoner who committed suicide at Old Colony Correctional Center after all his medications were taken away. The defendants include Department of Correction staff who failed to take proper emergency measures after he was discovered hanging in his cell. The case was filed in July of 2013. Defendants removed the case to federal court, but it was remanded back to state court on December 30, 2013. We have reached separate settlement with both the Department of Correction and MHM defendants. The court approved the settlement in January of 2015.
Paszko v. Commissioner of Correction
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This class action case was filed on June 10, 2015 in federal court and seeks to compel DOC to treat prisoners with Hepatitis C with the new medications that were approved by the FDA in 2014. PLS is co-counseling the case with National Lawyers Guild member firms Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin and David Kelston. The new medications are a dramatic improvement over their predecessors, curing nearly one hundred percent of patients, with few side effects. Yet DOC was treating only a handful of prisoners primarily because the medications are extremely expensive. The complaint alleged that the failure to provide this essential treatment violates the Eighth Amendment rights of the more than 1,500 prisoners in DOC custody who have Hepatitis C. The court certified the case as a class action. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on February 15, 2018 and the Court approved it on June 29, 2018. The Agreement calls for medications to be provided to hundreds of prisoners who were previously denied treatment. We are now monitoring compliance.
PETA v. Department of Agricultural Resources
(Staff Assaults)
We filed an amicus brief in the SJC in a case that will decide the scope of exemption (n) of the Public Records Act, which shields documents the disclosure of which might jeopardize public safety. Although the issue in the case is whether names of primate researchers were properly withheld under exemption (n), PLS has a strong interest in this case because several sheriffs have invoked the exemption to deny us access to video recordings of alleged excessive force against prisoners. At the oral argument on February 6, 2017, the AAG told the court that she agreed with PLS that exemption (n) should not block access to the use of force videos so we are hopeful that the ultimate decision will be favorable.
Pearson v. Hodgson
(Conditions of Confinement)
This class action case, which was filed in May of 2018, is an outgrowth of the Petition we filed with the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Cable challenging exorbitant prison phone rates. PLS is co-counseling with the National Consumer Law Center, the Harvard’s Legal Services Center and Bailey Glaser, LLP. The complaint alleges that the kickback received by Bristol County Sheriff Hodgson from the prison phone company, Securus, is illegal under state law. The kickback effectively doubles the cost of phone calls for prison families and other consumers. If successful, this case will not only impact prisoners held at the Bristol county jail, but at all county facilities in Massachusetts that contract with Securus Technologies, and perhaps the DOC as well. In addition, it will significantly lower prison phones rates and return millions of dollars to the families and friends of prisoners who have paid these exorbitant phone rates over the last four years.
The case was removed to federal court by Securus Technologies and a hearing was held on October 23, 2018 on the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. On December 20, 2019, Judge Talwini denied both Sheriff Hodgson’s and Securus’ Motion to Dismiss, in any opinion strongly suggesting that the commissions are unlawful. Discovery is now underway. Defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and on July 26, 2019, we filed a motion for partial summary judgment and a motion for class certification. The court scheduled a hearing on these motions for March 23, 2020, but then cancelled the hearing because of COVID-19. The court rescheduled the hearing for June 11. At the hearing, she asked the parties to address the significance of G.L.c. 127, § 3, which both parties stated was not pertinent to the claim. However, on June 22, 2020, she held that the Sheriff does have the authority to charge telephone commissions, relying largely on the language in Section 3 relating to the sale of goods and services to prisoners that even the Defendant had rejected and that neither party had briefed. On July 20, we filed a motion to amend the judgment, and also asked her to certify the issue to the Supreme Judicial Court. On March 31, 2021, the Court allowed our motion and certified the question to the SJC. Unfortunately, on May 17, 2022, although it rejected the Section 3 argument, the SJC ruled that a special law transferring county government to the state implicitly authorized counties to collect and retain telephone fees. Although this is an extremely disappointing decision, we are optimistic that the Legislature will pass some version of the No-Cost Calls law that has been included in both the Senate and House FY23 budget.
Petition Seeking Relief from Unjust and Unreasonable Cost of Collect Telephone Calls from Prisoners
(Conditions of Confinement)
This is a petition filed with the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Cable on behalf of prisoners, family members, lawyers, and others who seek relief from the excessive costs and poor quality of telephone calls from prisoners in state and county facilities. In response to the Petition, DTC conducted a well-attended public hearing on July 19, 2012, at which it received powerful and compelling testimony about the high cost and terrible quality of prison and jail phone service, and on September 26, 2013, the DTC denied the phone companies’ motion to dismiss our petition and announced its intention to open an investigation. At the same time, the Federal Communications Commission was in the midst of its own regulatory process (dating back to 2000) in which PLS actively participated. In October of 2015, the FCC adopted permanent per-minute limits on in-state and intrastate rates as well as fees for services such as opening or closing a debit account. It also prohibited per-call surcharges. The Order cited and relied upon PLS comments in support of regulation. The providers challenged all of these provisions in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which stayed the per-minute limits pending appeal but left in place the prohibition of per-call surcharges, which took effect with regard to state prisons on March 17, 2016, and will take effect with regard to county facilities on June 20, 2016. The FCC also encouraged states to set lower rates. On August 4, 2016, the FCC granted a motion for reconsideration and ordered slightly higher rates: $0.13 per minute for debit card and pre-paid calls from state prisons, $0.19-$0.31 for debit calls from jails (with the smallest jails allowed the highest rate), and higher rates at the outset for collect calls, dropping to the debit rates by 2018. However, the court of appeals has stayed these limits.
The Massachusetts rate cap (as challenged by the Petitioners) was $0.10 per minute plus a per-call charge of up to $3.00. With the FCC’s ban on per-call charges, the telephone companies sought to maintain their profits – and their kickbacks to jails in the form of “commissions” – by folding the surcharge into the per-minute rate. They also asked that the Investigation in our case be closed. PLS asked that the full investigation into the rates and the quality of serviced proceed, and argued that in the interim the companies could profitably operate at $0.10 per minute. On June 14, 2016, the Hearing Officer ordered a full investigation into all issues raised by the Petitioners. However, it stayed the investigation pending a ruling on the FCC regulations and set interim rates at $0.21 per minute for debit and prepaid calls, and $0.25 per minute for collect calls.
One of the phone companies has now asserted that DTC has no jurisdiction to regulate prison phones and has unilaterally raised its rates above the cap. The DTC has yet to take a position on whether it has jurisdiction. Consequently, we, together with the National Consumer Law Center, have sued both Sheriff Hodgson and Securus Technologies – the telephone provider – for taking money from customers to pay kickbacks to the Sheriffs. See Pearson v. Hodgson, described below.
Porter v. Sheriff, Middlesex County
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
This is a claim for damages brought by a prisoner with severe mental illness who was improperly placed in a restraint chair at the Middlesex House of Correction for an excessively prolonged period of time and under conditions that caused serious and emotional harm. We have negotiated significant changes in the Middlesex County restraint policies and practices, and have reached a settlement of Mr. Porter’s damage claim for $27,000.
Porter v. Sheriff, Middlesex County
(Staff Assaults)
This is a claim for damages brought by a prisoner with severe mental illness who was improperly placed in a restraint chair at the Middlesex House of Correction for excessively prolonged period of time and under conditions that caused serious and emotional harm. We have negotiated significant changes in the Middlesex County restraint policies and practices, and have reached a settlement of Mr. Porter’s damage claim for $27,000.
Reaves v. Department of Correction
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
Timothy Reaves is a fifty-year-old quadriplegic man who has been serving a life sentence in DOC prisons for almost 20 years. He is suffering from grossly incompetent medical care, a total failure to accommodate his disabilities to allow him to participate in the programs and services of the prison, and near-total isolation and sensory deprivation. The Complaint, filed in Federal Court, alleges that this treatment violates the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. We have asked the court to issue a preliminary injunction directing DOC to transfer Mr. Reaves to an appropriate medical facility since DOC has proved incapable of providing minimally adequate care. After conducting seven days of evidentiary hearings, Judge Hillman, on July 15, 2016, issued a comprehensive preliminary injunction, which included the appointment of a monitor to ensure compliance. The court extended the preliminary injunction for another 90 days on October 17, 2016.
On September 14, 2018, we settled the damage claim with MPCH. Unfortunately, in 2018, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the DOC defendants on Mr. Reaves claims for damages.
Trial on the claims for injunctive relief was held in May of 2019. In July of 2019, the court issued a decision, ruling that DOC had violated Mr. Reaves’ constitutional rights to adequate medical care, and ordering DOC to transfer him immediately to a hospital outside the correctional system. In August of 2019 the court denied the Defendants’ motion for a stay. On August 28, 2019, the defendants filed various post-trial motions seeking to vacate the judgment. The court denied these motions; however, Defendants appealed. The district court has continued to hold hearings to discuss efforts to find a placement for Mr. Reaves outside DOC. Most recently, PLS found a clinically acceptable for placement for Mr. Reaves in a nursing home and DOC granted him a medical parole to that facility. But because DOC put unacceptable conditions on the medical parole, we moved to hold the commissioner in contempt, and the court completed hearings on this motion on May 5, 2020, and has the matter under advisement. On May 8, 2020, we also filed our brief in the First Circuit. However, the First Circuit allowed DOC to file a new brief to address Judge Hillman’s ongoing orders. At the oral argument on October 7, 2020, the court stayed the appeal for 90 days to give the parties further time to remove obstacles preventing Mr. Reaves’ transfer. On August 5, 2021, Mr. Reaves was – at long last – moved from DOC to a medical facility. On September 15, 2021, the court issued a final order administratively closing the case but prohibiting DOC from returning Reaves to its custody without the permission of the court, and retain jurisdiction of the case for three years.
On November 2, 2021, the First Circuit asked for briefing on whether the appeal was moot. We argued that it was, since Mr. Reaves has now been released on medical parole. But we also argued that the underlying judgment should remain in place. On December 14, 2021, the First Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because Mr. Reaves is out of DOC custody and also vacated the judgment. In June of 2022, we settled our claim for attorneys’ fees for $280,000.
Richardson v. Sheriff, Middlesex County
(Conditions of Confinement)
This case concerns overcrowding at the Middlesex County Jail in Cambridge. Although there is a court-ordered population cap at the Jail, the population regularly exceeds the cap by a substantial number. Since existing remedies failed to keep the population below the cap, we filed a motion for further injunctive relief asking the court to enforce the cap by releasing prisoners. The Defendants proposed moving prisoners from the Jail to the House of Correction in Billerica, which is also subject to a court-ordered cap in Doyle v. Sheriff, Middlesex County. We have assembled a team of lawyers, including the ACLU and private counsel to litigate both cases. On June 14, 2013, the Court allowed, in part, the plaintiff’s motion for further relief, ordering that a hard cap of 230 be established at the Jail, and imposing limits on the total number of prisoners who can be confined at the House of Correction. The Court subsequently imposed separate caps on each unit at the Jail, prohibited placing prisoners in a dungeon-like basement unit, and ordered the Defendants to notify plaintiffs and the Court if the population of any unit goes above the cap. The construction of new buildings at the Jail was complete in June of 2014. As a result, the Court allowed the Sheriff’s motion to close the Cambridge Jail and transfer all detainees to the newly constructed units at the House of Correction. We are continuing to monitor conditions at the House of Correction.
Roberio v. Chair, Massachusetts Parole Board
(Parole)Toggle Title
This is a challenge on ex post facto grounds to the retroactive application of an amendment to G. L. c. 127, § 133A, which allows the parole board to increase the maximum permissible period between parole hearings ( called the setback period)from three to five years for persons serving life sentences who are denied parole. On October 24, 2019, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded for further discovery to determine whether prisoners given a four or five-year setback had a realistic opportunity to obtain an earlier hearing, or whether the right to request such a hearing was illusory. PLS filed an amicus brief before the SJC and is now co-counseling with CPCS in the Superior Court, where discovery is now complete and we have served a motion for summary judgment.
Robinson v Grocki
(Staff Assaults)
This is a case brought by a prisoner who was assaulted at MCI Cedar Junction by two guards with a long history of brutally assaulting prisoners and then intimidating staff into covering up for them. The two officers were subsequently fired and indicted for assaulting a different prisoner. In this case, we are also suing the Superintendent and other officials for their failure to supervise the two rogue officers. The Supervisory defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 7, 2017.
Souza v. Hodgson
(Conditions of Confinement)
Class action challenge to pay-for-stay fees, as well as fees for medical care, haircuts, and GED services, at Bristol County Jail and House of Correction. The court allowed our motion for summary judgment in July of 2004. In August 2004, the single justice denied the Sheriff’s motion relief pending appeal. On March 30, 2005, the court allowed our motion for class certification and ordered the Sheriff to return the fees. The Sheriff appealed the judgment. On January 5, 2010, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling in all respects. On January 7, 2011, the court approved the process for prisoners to get back the fees with interest. Checks were mailed to eligible class members on May 3, 2012. Approximately $75,000 remains in the Settlement Fund, which will be distributed to four organizations in Bristol County that provide drug treatment and other services to former prisoners or individuals at risk of becoming prisoners.
Souza v. Hodgson
(Medical & Mental Health Care)
Class action challenge to pay-for-stay fees, as well as fees for medical care, haircuts, and GED services, at Bristol County Jail and House of Correction. The court allowed our motion for summary judgment in July of 2004. In August 2004, the single justice denied the Sheriff’s motion relief pending appeal. On March 30, 2005, the court allowed our motion for class certification and ordered the Sheriff to return the fees. The Sheriff appealed the judgment. On January 5, 2010, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling in all respects. On January 7, 2011, the court approved the process for prisoners to get back the fees with interest. Checks were mailed to eligible class members on May 3, 2012. Approximately $75,000 remains in the Settlement Fund, which will be distributed to four organizations in Bristol County that provide drug treatment and other services to former prisoners or individuals at risk of becoming prisoners.
Weymouth v Cousins
(Staff Assaults)
Case brought on behalf of a prisoner at the Essex County House of Correction who was assaulted in his cell by officers resulting in multiple injuries including a broken nose, two chipped teeth, and a laceration above his right eye that required three sutures. In addition, the defendants retaliated against Mr. Weymouth for asking a mental health worker to contact his mother to tell her about his injuries. The case was brought against individual officers and also against supervisory officials at the House of Correction for condoning and tolerating excessive force by officers against prisoners. Defendants removed the case to federal court. On March 19, 2014, we settled this case with damages to the Plaintiff and an agreement by the Defendants to make significant changes to use of force policies and practices and grievance procedures in Essex County. We are now monitoring compliance.
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As of February 1, 2026, PLS has a new address located on a different floor in the same building.
Our new address is:
Prisoners’ Legal Services
50 Federal Street, 7th Floor
Boston, MA 02110
Any mail already in transit will be forwarded. Thank you!